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Essays on Optimal Insurance Design
Johannes Spinnewijn
This dissertation consists of three chapters that analyze
the optimal design of insurance contracts and unemployment
insurance in particular. I consider three relevant contexts that
change the central trade-off between the provision of insurance and the provision of incentives.
The first chapter examines the role of biased beliefs for
the optimal design of static and dynamic insurance contracts.
Biased risk perceptions change the perceived value of insurance and the perceived returns to avoiding these risks. I show
empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how
quickly they will find work, but underestimate the return to
their search efforts. I analyze how these biases drive a wedge
between social and private insurance, and between naive and
optimal policy implementation.
The second chapter considers the role of training for
the design of unemployment insurance. A worker’s human capital falls upon displacement and depreciates during
unemployment. Training counters the decrease in human
capital, but also changes the willingness of the unemployed
to search. I characterize the optimal unemployment insurance
contract and analyze the optimal timing of unemployment
benefits and training programs during unemployment.
The third chapter analyzes the role of heterogeneity in
risk perceptions for the optimal design of screening contracts
in a model with moral hazard and adverse selection. I show
how optimists receive less insurance than pessimists, and
I contrast the distortions in insurance coverage that arise
with competing and monopolistic insurers. Heterogeneity in
beliefs strengthens the case for government intervention in
insurance markets and can explain the negative correlation
between risk occurrence and insurance coverage found in
empirical studies.

Introduction
People face risks and dislike the variation in income
due to these risks. They are willing to give up consumption
in good times to increase their consumption in bad times.
Whether times are good or bad often depends on their own
behavior. People can mitigate the risk or reduce the probability that a loss occurs by exerting precautionary effort.
Moral hazard arises when insured people do not account for
the consequences of their behavior on the expected expenditures for the insurer. The insured will exert less precautionary efforts the more insured they are. Insurers thus face a
fundamental trade-off between providing insurance against
risks and providing incentives to avoid risks. This trade-off is
central to the design of optimal insurance contracts.
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The trade-off between insurance and incentives also
arises for the design of social insurance contracts, like unemployment insurance. Workers may lose their jobs beyond
their control. They are willing to pay a tax when employed in
order to receive unemployment benefits when they lose their
jobs. Unemployed workers do not fully control how rapidly
they are employed again, but by exerting search efforts they
can increase the probability to find a job. Unemployment
insurance insures the unemployed against the loss of their
labor earnings, but also reduces the incentives to search for
a job.

Chapter 1
Unemployed but Optimistic: Optimal Insurance
Design with Biased Beliefs
Insurers face the trade-off between providing insurance against risks and incentives to avoid risks. The risk
perceptions of the insured are central to this trade-off. The
perceived likelihood of risks determines the perceived value
of insurance against these risks. The perceived return to precautionary effort determines the effectiveness of incentives
to avoid risks. Both types of perceptions are often subject
to systematic biases. Psychological research has shown
that people often overestimate the probability of positive
events and underestimate the probability of negative events
(Slovic 2000; Weinstein 1980, 1982, 1984) and can either be
optimistic (Langer 1975) or discouraged (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld,
and Zeisel 1971) about the degree to which they control
outcomes. These particular biases complement the heuristics
and biases in probabilistic thinking documented by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974).
The central contribution of this chapter is the theoretical
and empirical analysis of unemployment insurance and the
biases in beliefs held by the unemployed. On the theoretical
side, I analyze how biased beliefs change the optimal design
of static and dynamic insurance contracts in the presence of
moral hazard. The distinction between the baseline belief
about the probability of finding work and the control belief
about the extent to which search efforts increase this probability is shown to be essential. The theoretical results generalize to insurance applications with moral hazard, other than
unemployment insurance. On the empirical side, I present
new evidence that suggests that job seekers are highly optimistic about the probability of finding a job, but pessimistic
about their control.
Using data collected by Price et al. (2004), I link the
expectations of unemployed job seekers with the actual outcomes of their job searches. The first empirical result is that
job seekers largely underestimate the duration of their unemployment spells; on average they expect to remain unemployed for 7 weeks, but actually need 23 weeks to find new
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employment. Many more job seekers have underestimated
rather than overestimated the length of their unemployment
spells, and the forecast errors are much more pronounced for
the optimistic than for the pessimistic job seekers, as presented in Figure 1. The second empirical result is that job seekers
who report searching more intensively are less optimistic
about the length of their unemployment spells. Controlling
for heterogeneity and endogeneity, I provide evidence that
job seekers underestimate the returns to their search efforts.
Job seekers who search harder expect shorter unemployment
spells, but the actual reduction in the unemployment spell is
larger than expected. This suggests that job seekers are at the
same time baseline-optimistic and control-pessimistic; they
overestimate the baseline probability of finding work, but
underestimate their control over this probability.
The theoretical analysis builds on a canonical result
for social insurance known as the Baily formula. Optimal
insurance equalizes the benefit of smoothing consumption
between states and the moral hazard cost at the margin. Baily
(1978) formalized this principle for unemployment insurance
in a static model with moral hazard. For unemployment insurance to be optimal, the relative difference in marginal utilities of consumption in employment and unemployment has
to be equal to the elasticity of the unemployment duration
to the unemployment benefit level. I show how this characterization needs to be adjusted when the insured have biased
beliefs. I assume that the insurer knows the insured’s beliefs
and that these beliefs cannot be manipulated by the insurer,
nor changed in response to the contract being offered. These
assumptions correspond to a setting with different priors
where the insurer and the insured “agree to disagree.”
I contrast the contracts offered by two extreme types of
insurers: a social planner, who is paternalistic and maximizes
the insured agent’s true expected utility, and competing
private insurers, who maximize the insured agent’s perceived
expected utility. When beliefs are unbiased, the probability
weights in the respective expected utility functions are the
same. The social optimum and the competitive equilibrium
coincide. Moral hazard, in contrast with adverse selection,
is no reason for government intervention as long as beliefs
are unbiased. When beliefs are biased, the social optimum
and the competitive equilibrium diverge. The implied wedge
suggests a previously unexplored welfare cost of privatizing
insurance.
In the social optimum the smoothing benefit and the moral
hazard cost are still equalized at the margin, but with the
moral hazard cost corrected for the search internality that
arises when the insured agent misperceives the impact of her
search on her own true expected utility. An increase in insurance coverage decreases the induced effort level, but when an
agent is pessimistic about her control, she already exerts too
little effort. Thus, with control-pessimistic insurees, the moral
hazard cost of insurance needs to be revised upward because
of the search internality. The elasticity of the unemploy-
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Figure 1 Histogram of Differences between Actual and
Expected Unemployment Duration

SOURCE: Unemployed job seekers in Maryland and Detroit
between 1996 and 1998 surveyed by Price et al. (2004).

ment duration to unemployment benefits no longer provides
sufficient information to implement the optimal insurance
contract. A naive policymaker, who ignores the pessimistic
control bias and implements the standard Baily formula, sets
the unemployment benefit level suboptimally high.
Private insurers do not correct for the search internality and focus on the insured’s perceived value of insurance.
In the competitive equilibrium, the moral hazard cost of
additional insurance is set equal to the perceived smoothing benefit. When an agent is optimistic about the baseline
probability of finding work, she underestimates the value of
unemployment insurance. Private insurers respond to this
bias by offering less or even no insurance at all. This may
explain the puzzle of why unemployment insurance is almost
always publicly provided.1 Competition disciplines insurers
to charge actuarially fair prices, but not to correct people’s
distorted demand for insurance.
I proceed to consider a dynamic extension of the unemployment model along the lines of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). The conventional wisdom in economic policy
debates is that unemployment benefits should be decreasing with the length of the unemployment spell. The threat
of falling benefits in the future increases the incentives for
unemployed workers to search for work (Shavell and Weiss
1979). First, I show, using Baily-type conditions, that the
adjustment of the optimal dynamic characterization for the
presence of biases in beliefs is very similar, as in the static
model; the social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for
the search internality, while the private insurers focus on the
perceived smoothing benefits. Second, when unemployed
agents underestimate the duration of unemployment, the
social planner may increase welfare by providing more incentives to the short-term unemployed than to the long-term
unemployed. Optimism about the duration of unemployment
makes the threat of receiving lower unemployment benefits
in the future less effective in inducing search efforts. I show
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that in contrast with private insurers, the social planner may
prefer to make unemployment benefits more rapidly decreasing at the start of the unemployment spell and more slowly
later on.
I calibrate the dynamic model in order to numerically
analyze the impact of biased beliefs on the optimal design
of unemployment insurance. The calibration exercise also
shows that the consumption subsidy required to make the
agent insured by private insurers as well off as in the social
optimum, increases exponentially in the baseline bias. Although the risk of an unemployment spell seems small within
a lifetime, privatizing the insurance provision comes at a
very high welfare cost if beliefs are strongly biased.

Related Literature
The empirical and experimental evidence on the misperceptions of probabilities has led to two recent strands of
literature. One strand proposes explanations for biases in
beliefs and shows how these biases can be sustained in
equilibrium. Examples are Bénabou and Tirole (2002 and
2006), Compte and Postlewaite (2004), Glaeser (2004), Van
den Steen (2004), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Gollier
(2005), and Köszegi (2006). These theoretical papers suggest that optimistic beliefs, either about the baseline probability of success or one’s control, are more likely to arise
and persist than pessimistic beliefs. This corresponds to the
empirical evidence that I find for the unemployed’s baseline
beliefs, but contrasts with the empirical evidence for the
unemployed’s control beliefs.
The theoretical analysis in this chapter is related to the
second strand of literature that takes biases in risk perceptions as given and analyzes the consequences for contract
design in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection.
de la Rosa (2007) and Santos-Pinto (2008) analyze how incentive contracts proposed by a profit-maximizing principal
change in response to particular optimistic biases. The response depends on the extent to which the considered biases
make the agent more baseline-optimistic or control-optimistic as defined here. Also, changes in control beliefs change
the price of providing incentives relative to insurance. The
effect of changing control beliefs on the induced effort level
is unambiguous; the effect on the insurance provision is
not. The main focus of this chapter is on the unambiguous
comparison, for a given bias in beliefs, between social and
private insurance on the one hand and optimal and naive
implementation on the other. Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004)
and Villeneuve (2005) study the effects of exogenous biased
beliefs in models with adverse selection due to heterogeneity
in risk. Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Grubb (forthcoming), and
Sandroni and Squintani (2007) study adverse selection due to
heterogeneity in risk perceptions. In Chapter 3, I also allow
for heterogeneity in risk perceptions by relaxing the assumption made in this chapter that the agent’s prior is known to
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the principal. I then analyze how agents are screened with
contracts providing different levels of insurance coverage
depending on the difference in baseline and control beliefs.
The comparison between social and private insurance
relates to the policy and welfare analysis in the behavioral
public economics literature, studying nonstandard decision
makers.2 The use of the true probabilities to evaluate welfare
is paternalistic, but highlights the contrast with the considerations of profit-maximizing insurers. The comparison also
relates to the distinction between a paternalistic and populist
government, with the latter catering to its voters’ beliefs
(Salanié and Treich 2009). The use of the true probabilities
also assumes that these are measurable. Bernheim and Rangel (2009) argue that the presence of ancillary conditions,
like framing issues, may distort people’s choices. To the
extent that better informing individuals alleviates ancillary
conditions, the perceived probabilities after individuals are
informed are more appropriate for evaluating their welfare
than the perceived probabilities before they are informed.
The empirical estimation of the biases in beliefs in this chapter can help to identify agents’ true preferences from their
observed choices, as argued by Köszegi and Rabin (2007 and
2008). Finally, the comparison between the implementation
of the standard and adjusted Baily formula adds to the recent
literature reviewed by Chetty (2009) that analyzes conditions
under which sufficient statistic formulas for taxation and
social insurance apply or need to be adjusted.

Chapter 2
Training and Search during Unemployment
Optimal unemployment insurance trades off the provision
of incentives to search for work and the insurance against the
consequences of unemployment. The obvious consequence
of unemployment is the foregone wage while unemployed.
However, after returning to work, many still have substantially lower wages than before displacement. In the United
States, one fourth of the reemployed have wages that were
at least 25 percent lower than in their previous jobs (Kling
2006). It has been argued that these future income losses
for the unemployed are due to the loss of human capital.
Displaced workers lose human capital the moment they lose
their jobs, and their human capital continues to depreciate
during unemployment. Unemployment insurance should
therefore insure the unemployed against both the loss of
current earnings and the expected loss of future earnings. At
the same time, incentives for search are more important for
a given level of human capital if finding a job avoids further
depreciation of human capital.
Effective training programs counter the loss of human
capital. Many countries are increasing the emphasis on training to reintegrate the unemployed in the workforce. Spending on labor market programs, active and passive, averages
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3 percent of GDP in the OECD countries. The proportion
of spending on active labor market programs rather than on
unemployment benefits has increased to 40–50 percent in
most European countries, of which on average 40 percent is
spent on training. The impact of training programs has been
estimated in the empirical literature. An important conclusion
of this literature is the heterogeneity in impact of the different programs (Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999). More
recent work supports the positive long-run effect of training
programs with a substantial human capital component (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2005; Jespersen, Munch, and
Skipper 2004; Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 2005; WinterEbmer 2006).
This chapter analyzes the role of training for the design of
unemployment insurance. I characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract, specifying both consumption
and training contingent on the duration of the unemployment
spell. I consider a model in which a worker’s human capital
decreases during unemployment, but training efforts counter
this decrease.3 The training efforts are imposed by the social
planner, while the search efforts to find a job are chosen
by the unemployed worker. The unemployed worker bears
the cost of both the search and training efforts, which are
allowed to interact, as in Holmström and Milgrom (1991).
More training may increase the marginal cost of search. I
assume that the same training technology is not available on
the job. One justification is that employers are not willing to
provide training that is not specific to their firms.
If the training technology is sufficiently effective, the
unemployed worker is in one of three states depending on the
level of human capital:
1) In the training state, the level of human capital is so low
that no search is induced. Training efforts are imposed
to increase the level of human capital. Since no incentives are needed, the social planner can fully smooth the
unemployed’s consumption.
2) In the training-and-search state, human capital is sufficiently high so that search efforts are induced. The social
planner faces the trade-off between providing insurance and incentives. The depreciation of human capital
increases both the value of insurance and the need for
incentives. By mitigating the depreciation, training efforts relax the trade-off. The design of the optimal contract for an unemployed agent in the training-and-search
state will be dependent on the complementarity between
search and training in the expected value of finding a job
and the rivalry in the cost structure.
3) In a stationary state, the social planner makes the unemployed maintain the same level of human capital by
following training programs. At the same time they are
given incentives to search for a job.
I characterize analytically how consumption during unemployment and upon re-employment depends on the length
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of the unemployment spell. As long as search is induced, the
introduction of training does not change the result by Shavell
and Weiss (1979) that unemployment consumption should
be decreasing over time when preferences are additive in
consumption and search efforts. However, in the training
state, no search is induced and unemployment consumption
remains constant. The intuition of Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997) that taxes upon reemployment should increase with
the duration of the unemployment spell does not generalize with the introduction of human capital depreciation and
training. The social planner wants to protect the unemployed
against human capital losses and may prefer to subsidize
employment, even after long unemployment spells.
I perform numerical simulations for CARA preferences
with monetary costs of efforts. I show that for such preferences the state space of the recursive problem becomes
one-dimensional. The numerical simulations suggest that
the human capital of the long-term unemployed converges
globally to a unique stationary level. This has two important
policy implications. First, if training costs are not too high,
it is never optimal to discourage the unemployed worker
from search activity, whatever the length of the unemployment spell. This contrasts with Pavoni (2009) and Pavoni
and Violante (2007). Without training technology, they show
that after a finite number of unsuccessful searches, the social
planner switches to social assistance, an absorbent policy
characterized by constant unemployment benefits and no
active participation. Second, the difference between this
unique, stationary level and the level of human capital at the
start of the unemployment spell determines the optimal timing of training. If the initial level of human capital is lower,
training is more intensive toward the start of unemployment. If the initial level of human capital is higher, training
becomes more intensive throughout unemployment.
The human capital level at the start and the stationary
level are determined, respectively, by the fall in human
capital upon displacement and the depreciation in human
capital during unemployment. Although in practice training
is more focused toward the long-term unemployed, this is
only optimal if the depreciation in human capital is relatively more important than the fall upon displacement. Upon
displacement, the unemployed may lose firm-specific human
capital. They also lose human capital specific to the industry
if they are reemployed in a different industry (Ljungqvist and
Sargent 1998; Neal 1995). These losses may become very
important in an economy with declining industries or industries shifting production abroad. The depreciation during
unemployment can be interpreted as the explicit loss of skills
during unemployment or as a process of “unlearning by not
doing” (Coles and Masters 2000). If unemployment spells
persist for a long time, unemployed workers can get detached
from the labor market and lose work habits and confidence in
the own skills (Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2006b). Although
the empirical evidence for the decline and depreciation of
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human capital is mixed, both have been central in explaining the persistence of unemployment and the European
unemployment dilemma (Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998;
Machin and Manning 1999; Pissarides 1992), as well as the
negative duration dependence of exit rates (Acemoglu 1995;
Blanchard and Diamond 1994).
This chapter builds on a recent literature that departs from
stationary search models (Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997;
Shavell and Weiss 1979) with the introduction of depreciating human capital. Shimer and Werning (2006) analyze
the optimal timing of benefits in a McCall search model,
assuming that savings are not observable. Human capital
depreciation reduces the arrival rate of job offers or deteriorates the distribution of the wages being paid on the job.
Pavoni (2009) analyzes the optimal unemployment insurance
contract when the unemployed agent has the binary choice to
exert costly search effort or not. The depreciation of human
capital reduces the output upon reemployment and the probability to become employed if searching. In this chapter, I
assume that human capital only determines the output. Since
search is a continuous choice in my model, the decrease in
output due to the depreciation reduces the returns to search.
The probability to become employed endogenously decreases during the unemployment spell if no training technology
is available. Pavoni and Violante (2007) introduce costly job
monitoring as an alternative to the provision of incentives
and analyze the optimal sequencing of different unemployment policies. Pavoni and Violante (2007) and Wunsch
(2008) also introduce a training technology in the numerical simulations of the model in Pavoni and Violante (2007).
In contrast with my approach, training efforts cannot be
imposed, but they are induced by rewarding the unemployed
for high values of human capital with higher unemployment
benefits. Training and search efforts are also assumed to be
extreme rivals and cannot both be exerted in the same period.

Chapter 3
Insurance and Perceptions: How to Screen
Optimists and Pessimists
The perception of risk is inherently subjective.4 Financial
traders disagree about the risk of investments, mortgage
bankers about the risk of defaulting homeowners, homeowners and renters about the risk of flooding, old and young
drivers about the risk of a car accident. One person may
perceive a risk as very likely, while another may perceive
the same risk as unlikely. At the same time, the perception
of the extent to which precautionary efforts mitigate the risk
may differ as well. Both the perception of the likelihood of
the risk and the perception of control are central to the design
of insurance contracts. Baseline-pessimistic insurees, who
underestimate the baseline likelihood of the risk, are willing
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to pay more for insurance. Control-optimistic insurees, who
overestimate the marginal return to effort, exert more precautionary efforts and are therefore cheaper to insure.
This chapter analyzes the role of heterogeneity in risk
perceptions for the optimal design of screening contracts.
In a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, I show
how incentive compatibility imposes a very simple structure
on the equilibrium contracts and I contrast the distortions in
insurance coverage that arise with competing and monopolistic insurers. On the positive side, heterogeneity in risk
perceptions offers an alternative explanation for the negative
correlation between risk occurrence and insurance coverage found in empirical studies. On the normative side, the
presence of agents with biased beliefs improves or worsens
the welfare of agents with unbiased beliefs depending on the
market structure and the differences in beliefs.
I consider a simple model with two states. Effort exerted
by the insuree decreases the probability that a risk occurs,
but insurees can have different perceptions about the probability of the risk as a function of effort. The insurer cannot
observe the belief held by the insuree, but perceives her risk
as independent of her belief. The insuree does not change
her belief in response to the menu of insurance contracts
being offered. That is, the insurer and the insurees “agree
to disagree” about the true underlying risk. The preferences
satisfy a single-crossing property if the one insuree perceives
the likelihood of the risk as lower than the other insuree
for any given insurance contract. This is conditional on the
effort levels chosen by the respective insurees. Optimism
can therefore arise for two reasons; first of all, if an insuree
is more optimistic about the baseline likelihood of the risk
for the same level of effort and, second, if an insuree is more
optimistic about the marginal return of effort and therefore
exerts higher effort for the same insurance contract. If the
single-crossing property is satisfied, the insurer can only
separate the (more) optimistic insuree by offering her less
insurance coverage than the (more) pessimistic insuree. This
monotonicity property is independent of the nature of competition between insurers.
Optimistic agents receive less insurance, but still may be
more risky ex-post if they are pessimistic about their control
and exert less precautionary effort. This contrasts with the
property of positive correlation between insurance coverage
and risk occurrence that arises in the standard adverse selection framework (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). However,
many empirical papers find a correlation that is not significantly positive (Cardon and Hendel 2001; Chiappori and
Salanié 1997, 2000) or even negative (Cawley and Philipson
1999; De Meza and Webb 2001; Finkelstein and McGarry
2006). With two types of insurees who only differ in their
beliefs, I show that it is sufficient that the one type is more
baseline-optimistic and control-optimistic for the equilibrium
to satisfy the positive correlation property. For the correla-
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tion to be negative, it is necessary that the control-pessimistic
type is also more optimistic about the likelihood of the risk.
A prime issue for characterizing optimal contracts with
private information is determining which incentive compatibility constraints are binding and thus which types’ contracts
are distorted compared to the case without private information. I show how this depends on the interaction between the
nature of competition and the dimension in which beliefs are
biased. Competing insurers distort the contract offered to the
insuree who can be insured at lower cost, which depends on
the exerted precautionary effort and thus the insuree’s control
beliefs. A monopolistic insurer distorts the contract offered to
the insuree whose willingness to pay is lower, which depends
on the insuree’s baseline beliefs. Compared to someone who
is unbiased, an optimist’s willingness to pay is lower for an
insurance contract providing more insurance than her outside
option, but higher for an incentive contract providing less
insurance than her outside option.
The distortions due to the screening of types imply that
agents with heterogeneous perceptions impose information
externalities on each other. An agent with biased beliefs
imposes a negative externality on an agent with unbiased beliefs, when private insurers distort the unbiased agent’s contract to discourage the biased agent from taking this contract.
The externality is only positive when a monopolistic insurer
pays a rent to the unbiased agent not to take the contract
offered to the biased type. For agents with biased beliefs,
the screening distortions may aggravate the distortion due to
the biases in their beliefs, as analyzed in Chapter 1. Hence,
heterogeneity in optimistic beliefs may strengthen the case
for (paternalistic) government intervention through mandating insurance. This contrasts with the result in Sandroni
and Squintani (2007) that heterogeneity in beliefs reduces
the scope for government intervention. The heterogeneity
in optimistic beliefs they consider implies that some agents
with different risks perceive their risk to be the same and are
pooled in equilibrium. The heterogeneity I consider implies
that agents with the same underlying risk are separated.

Related Literature
This chapter studies the role of biased beliefs in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. In Chapter
1, I consider only moral hazard, assuming that the bias in
beliefs is known to the insurer. Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004),
Chassagnon and Villeneuve (2005), and Villeneuve (2005)
consider only adverse selection. They introduce heterogeneity in risk types, but risk types may misperceive their risk.
Sandroni and Squintani (2007) also introduce heterogeneity
in risk types, but some agents of the high-risk type may be
optimistic about being a low-risk type.
A small theoretical literature has suggested explanations
for the advantageous selection with heterogeneous types that
leads to negative correlation between risk occurrence and in-
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surance coverage. Koufopoulos (2008) and Huang, Liu, and
Tzeng (2007) assume the presence of one type who exerts
no precautionary effort, but is still more optimistic about the
likelihood of the risk than the other type who exerts precautionary effort. This chapter generalizes this intuition driven
by heterogeneity in perceptions and characterizes how the
correlation between risk occurrence and insurance coverage depends on the correlation between baseline and control
beliefs. De Meza and Webb (2001) and Jullien, Salanié,
and Salanié (2007) explain the presence of advantageous
selection by heterogeneity in risk preferences. Chiappori
et al. (2006) show that such heterogeneity is not sufficient
to explain the negative correlation if the competition in the
insurance market is perfect. The correlation results in this
chapter are independent of the nature of competition.
This chapter also relates to the literature that explores how
firms exploit the bounded rationality of consumers, surveyed
in Ellison (2006). In particular, Grubb (forthcoming) and
Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) analyze how firms exploit differences in overconfidence and optimism about future demand
respectively with a menu of screening contracts. I also consider the externalities that biased agents and unbiased agents
impose on each other. In a similar spirit, DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyze
how sophisticated and nonsophisticated types affect each
others’ welfare.

Notes
I would like to thank my advisors, Bengt Holmstrom, Ivan Werning,
Jonathan Gruber, and Peter Diamond, for their support and valuable
discussions and suggestions.
1. Exceptions are unemployment insurance provided by trade
unions or voluntary public unemployment insurance systems
in countries like Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, grown
out of trade union programs (Parsons, Tranaes, and Lilleor
2003). The latter are heavily subsidized by the government, as
expected with baseline-optimistic insurees. The existence of
private information and aggregate risk and the government’s
advantage in coping with moral hazard have been suggested as
explanations for the absence of private unemployment insurance (Barr 2001; Chiu and Karni 1998). Acemoglu and Shimer
(2000) conclude, “Why unemployment insurance is almost
always publicly provided, in contrast to most other insurance
contracts, remains an important, unresolved question.”
2. For reviews, see Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Kanbur,
Pirttila, and Tuomala (2004).
3. I ignore the use of training programs to screen and target unemployment benefits (Akerlof 1978; Besley and Coate 1992)
4. Slovic (2000) surveys the research documenting the heterogeneity in the perception of risk and its determinants.
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